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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES REsULTING 
FROM PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS-Plaintiff, a dairy worker, suffered an infec-
tion in her left arm as a result of submitting to a Wassermann test as 
ordered by her employer. The county board of health required dairy 
workers to take the test as a condition of their employment and the order 
was issued in pursuance -thereof. Plaintiff filed a claim for compensation 
under the state Workmen's Compensation Act1 which was rejected by 
her employer but sustained upon a hearing before the state commission. 
Defendant's exceptions were overruled on appeal to the superior court. 
On appeal to the supreme court, held, reversed. The injury did not arise 
out of and in •the course of the employment and therefore is not com-
pensable under the act. King v. Arthur, 245 N.C. 599, 96 S.E. (2d) 846 
(1957). 
Under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, an injury, to be compen-
sable, must have arisen out of and in the course of the employment.2 In 
the case of an injury resulting from an examination which is required or 
requested by the employer, the origin of the impetus for the examination 
seems to be the decisive factor in determining if this requirement is met.3 
If the employer, of his own volition, orders or requests his employees to 
submit to an examination, an injury resulting therefrom is compensable.4 
1 N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §97-2(£). 
· 2See 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION I.Aw §6.00, p. 41 (1952). 
3 E.g., Industrial Commission v. Messinger, 116 Colo. 451, 181 P. (2d) 816 (1947); 
Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, 206 S.C. 103, 33 S.E. (2d) 81 (1945). 
4 Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, note 3 supra; Sanders v. Children's Aid Society, 238 
App. Div. 746, 265 N.Y.S. 698 (1933); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Mitchell, 
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If, however, the employer merely acts in pursuance of a public law or at 
the request of a public authority, the courts generally hold that resulting 
injuries are not compensable.5 The reasoning of the courts is that if the 
examination is at the instance of the employer, it is then a precautionary 
measure serving his interests and is therefore activity in the course of the 
employment. On the other hand, if the impetus for the examination comes 
from a public law or authority, the examination is solely for the benefit 
of the general public and thus devoid of any connection with the employ-
ment. 6 The principal case is in line with the authorities in that the em-
ployer ordered his employees to take the Wassermann test only because 
a regulation of the board of health required him to do so. However, 
application of this "original impetus" test to determine compensability 
seems unjustifiable. It is not uncommon for a state to require various pre-
cautionary measures of employers engaged in activities that may endanger 
the general public if a high degree of care is not exercised. In effect, the 
state is expanding the scope of the employer's activities in the interest of 
public welfare as a valid exercise of its police powers. Accordingly, a 
more realistic test would be to determine if the examination is occasioned 
by the particular type of work done, or merely by the fact that the employee 
is a member of the general public. For example, if a board of health, in its 
quest to have the general public examined, requests employers to have 
their employees cooperate, a resulting injury would not be compensable.7 
In such case, the examination is not prompted by the type of work in which 
the employee is engaged, but rather by the fact that he is merely a member 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 27 S.W. (2d) 600. See Saintsing v. Steinbach Co., 1 N.J.S. 259, 64 A. 
(2d) 99 (1949), and Smith v. Brown Paper Mill Co., (La. App. 1934) 152 S. 700, where 
the courts held that mere urging by the employer was sufficient to link the examination 
with the employment since this was coupled with the fact the employer would be in-
directly benefited by less absenteeism and better employee relations. 
5 Industrial Commission v. Messinger, note 3 supra (statute required all persons en-
gaged in the handling of food to be examined); Jefferson Printing Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 312 Ill. 575, 144 N.E. 356 (1924) (employer acted in response to a request 
from the commissioner of public health); Krout v. J. L. Hudson Co., 200 -Mich. 287, 166 
N.W. 848 (1918); Smith v. Seamless Rubber Co., 111 Conn. 365, 150 A. 110 (1930) (em-
ployer urged bis employees to submit to a vaccination which was requested by the board 
of health). See annotation, 69 A.L.R. 863 (1930). See also 1 LARSON, WoRKMEN's Co111-
PENSATION LAW §27.32, p. 416 (1952). Contra, Neudeck v. Ford Motor Co., 249 Mich. 
690, 229 N.W. 438 (1930), where, as in the Krout case, the employer strongly urged bis 
employees to submit to a vaccination at the request of the board of health. However, 
this case was distinguished from the Krout case on the basis that the company's physician 
had administered the vaccination rather than a public agency, and that there was less 
pressure on the employer to comply-a distinction of dubious validity. 
6 Krout v. J. L. Hudson Co., note 5 supra. Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, note 3 supra, 
in which the court reviewed the authorities and reaffirmed the application of the "original 
impetus" test. See I LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §27.32, P· 417 (1952). 
7 See Krout v. J. L. Hudson Co., note 5 supra, for this type of fact situation. In 
these circumstances the "original impetus" and "causal relation" tests would bring the 
same result. 
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of the general public and there is a better chance that he will submit if 
efforts are channeled through his employer. The proposed test is not unique 
in this area. It has been applied in the analogous so-called "public service" 
cases where an employee is injured while pursuing an activity which is 
not within the usual scope of his employment but required of him by 
public law. In those cases the courts have held that if his employment was 
responsible for his being subjected to the law which required him to 
perform the public service, then injuries arising out of that public service 
would be compensable.8 For example, where a taxicab driver, under his 
statutory duty, drove in pursuit of a criminal when ordered to do so by 
the police, and was injured during the chase, such injury was held com-
pensable.9 The court reasoned that the driver's particular employment 
required his driving on the public streets where he would be in constant 
danger of being ordered by the police to drive in pursuit of criminals. The 
causal relation between the nature of his employment and the public 
service from which the injury arose rendered the injury compensable. 
This "causal relation" test, if applied to the facts of the principal case, 
would have resulted in compensation since the Wasserman test was un-
doubtedly required because of the nature of the employment-the relatively 
great danger that a diseased dairy worker could infect the public through 
the handled milk. 
Michael M. Lyons 
SSee Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E. (2d) 844 (1954), where the court quotes 
with approval, "The inquiry has been whether his employment exposed •him to the 
risk, whatever it was, which actually caused the injury." See 1 LARSON, "\VoRKMEN's 
COMPENSATION LAW §28.32, p. 441 (1952). 
9 Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928). 
